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I.

INTRODUCTION

The story of the big change in the mission of juvenile court has
1
become familiar. From an institution which presented itself as
“saving the child,” it was transformed to one with the agenda of
2
“protecting the public.” Along the way the argument has been
made, with mixed success, that if the juvenile court is to be more
concerned with incapacitating youthful offenders than with
rehabilitating children, due process should be added, more or less
up to the standards that adults expect in the courts that process
3
criminal charges against them.
This Article addresses one of the byproducts of the shift in
juvenile court philosophy which has occurred in Minnesota and
many other states—the debate over whether, and how,
adjudications of delinquency should be used to aggravate the adult
criminal sentence of the former delinquent who has been

1. See generally Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN.
L. REV. 691 (1991) [hereinafter Transformation] (describing the most recent
reforms in juvenile courts at that time); Barry C. Feld, Juvenile Court Legislative
Reform and the Serious Young Offender: Dismantling the “Rehabilitative Ideal,” 65 MINN.
L. REV. 167 (1981) [hereinafter Dismantling] (discussing and critiquing legislative
reforms in Minnesota enacted in 1980).
2. Compare 1959 Minn. Laws 1275, 1275(“The purpose of the laws relating to
juvenile courts is to secure for each minor under the jurisdiction of the court the
care and guidance, preferably in his own home, as will serve the spiritual,
emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of the
state . . . .”), with 1999 Minn. Laws 583, 583 (“The purpose of the laws relating to
children alleged or adjudicated to be delinquent is to promote the public safety
and reduce juvenile delinquency . . . .”).
3. See, e.g., John M. Stuart & Philip D. Bush, It’s Time for Jury Trials in Juvenile
Court, HENNEPIN LAW., Mar.-Apr. 1981, at 8 (advocating for jury trial rights of
juvenile defendants); John M. Stuart, Right to Counsel: The Unkept Promise to Our
Juvenile Accused, BENCH & B. MINN., Aug. 1991, at 27 (advocating that Minnesota
should guarantee the right to counsel and other due process rights to juvenile
defendants). Since that time, the Minnesota Legislature has responded. See 1994
Minn. Laws ch. 576, § 20 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 260B.163, subd. 4
(1999) (requiring counsel in all delinquency cases where out-of-home placement
may be the outcome)).
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4

convicted of an adult offense. The use of adjudications for this
purpose in states like Minnesota, which do not provide a jury trial
in juvenile court, is a constitutional issue because of the Blakely
prohibition against adult sentence aggravations based on facts not
5
found by a jury.
Moreover, the broadest policy question of
juvenile court is at the center of the debate over the legal and social
meaning of juvenile adjudications: Do we really believe “kids are
different”?
This Article begins with a look at the history of the juvenile
courts in Minnesota, and the factors which caused the court’s shift
6
from its original rehabilitative purpose. In particular, the forceful
movement toward using juvenile adjudications as a means to
7
protect the general public’s safety is discussed in detail. Following
that discussion is an examination of the attempts made nationally
by states to consider the rehabilitative purpose on which the
juvenile courts were founded, as well as growing public safety
8
concerns over rising violent juvenile crime rates. The section also
reviews several important cases and laws in Minnesota that have
followed the national trend of allowing juvenile adjudications to be
used in determining adult punishments, and yet continuing to
9
deny due process protections to juveniles.
Finally, this Article concludes by noting that defining the
appropriate use of juvenile adjudications in adult sentencing has
been a challenge for the Minnesota Legislature, which has gone
10
back and forth over the issue. In fact, the 2005 crime bill, H.F. 1,
4. See Ellen Marrs, “That Isn’t Fair, Judge”: The Costs of Using Prior Juvenile
Delinquency Adjudications in Criminal Court Sentencing, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1323, 1329
(2004); Joseph B. Sanborn Jr., Striking Out on the First Pitch in Criminal Court, 1
BARRY L. REV. 7, 7 (2000).
5. Barry C. Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and McKeiver:
Sentence Enhancements Based on Delinquency Convictions and the Quality of Justice in
Juvenile Courts, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1111, 1114 (2003); see also Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). This issue may be resolved in Minnesota by the
pending decision before the Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. McFee. No. A05283, 2005 WL 2009288 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2005) (review granted Oct. 26,
2005). In McFee, the district court allowed use of a juvenile criminal history point
over an objection based on Blakely. Id. at *1. The court of appeals affirmed. Id. at
*4.
6. See discussion infra Parts II-III.
7. See infra Part III.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. See infra Part V.
10. For example, in State v. Boehl, the court determined that a juvenile
adjudication was not a prior “criminal-sexual-conduct conviction[]” for purposes
of imposing a ten-year-term of conditional release on an adult. 697 N.W.2d 215,
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11

takes two different approaches. The authors believe that one of
these, which mandate the use of Extended Juvenile Jurisdiction
adjudications if the juvenile has violated the juvenile disposition
12
order, will provide the best solution in the long run. This option
will be shown to be good juvenile justice policy, fair, constitutional,
and compatible with modern thought about adolescent
development.
II. THE STATUS OF JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS IN THE ERA OF THE
“REHABILITATIVE MODEL”
The public image of the first juvenile courts was fatherly and
benevolent. In fact, the common caricature of the kindly judge
hugging the delinquent youth was actually promulgated by a
leading juvenile court founder, who envisioned the judge “[s]eated
at a desk, with the child at his side, where he can on occasion put
13
his arm around his shoulder and draw the lad to him . . . .”
It follows that these courts did not envision themselves
creating a criminal record for each delinquent that would follow
him or her into adulthood. “To get away from the notion that the
child is to be dealt with as a criminal; to save it from the brand of
criminality, the brand that sticks to it for life; . . . to protect it from
14
the stigma,—this is the work [of the juvenile court].”
Proponents of juvenile court in Minnesota accepted this model
of “non-stigmatization.” Both the legislative and judicial branches
of government explicitly adopted the view that what happens in
222 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005). However, the court pointed out that the legislature
has included convictions and juvenile adjudications when drafting other
provisions of the Minnesota Statutes. Id. at 222 (citing MINN. STAT. § 243.166,
subd. 1(a)(1) (2004) (requiring registration as a predatory offender if adjudicated
delinquent); MINN. STAT. § 609.224, subd. 4(b) (enhancing fifth-degree assault to a
felony if adjudicated delinquent); MINN. STAT. § 624.713, subd. 1(b) (precluding
legal possession of a firearm if adjudicated delinquent)).
11. Compare 2005 Minn. Laws ch. 136, art. 13, § 6 (providing that a drug
offender who completes treatment in prison will not be considered for early
release if previously “adjudicated delinquent for a violent crime”), with id. art. 2, §
21 (“‘[C]onviction’ includes a conviction of an extended jurisdiction juvenile
under sections 260B.130 for a violation of, or an attempt to violate, section
609.342, 609.343, 609.344, or 609.3453, if the adult sentence has been executed.”).
This definition is a crucial part of the sex offender chapter of the bill, as it
determines which adults with prior juvenile adjudications will be subject to life
imprisonment for adult offenses.
12. See discussion infra Part VI.
13. Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 120 (1909).
14. Id. at 109.
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juvenile court, stays in juvenile court. The Juvenile Court Act of
1917 provided that no evidence from juvenile court proceedings
could be used elsewhere and, in particular, that no juvenile
15
adjudication could ever be treated as a criminal conviction.
The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed. In 1922, it heard a
claim that a girl, who had been adjudicated delinquent based on
truancy and placed at the County Home School for Girls in
16
Hennepin County, had been denied due process of law.
Foreshadowing arguments that would be made by the state of
17
Arizona in In re Gault, the Court held that determinations of
delinquency did not require due process because it is the “right of
18
the state to step in and save the child.” Moreover, the record of
the proceedings would never be able to be “used against the child
19
This view of juvenile court and the
in any other court.”
containment of its adjudicative records held up in Minnesota,
20
without any substantial questions being raised, for thirty-five years.
In 1957, Minnesota’s first hints of conceivable constitutional
questions surrounding collateral use of juvenile adjudications
21
surfaced in an article entitled “Fairness to the Juvenile Offender.”
The author hypothesized that “[if] the result of an adjudication of
delinquency is substantially the same as a verdict of guilty, the
youngster has been cheated of his constitutional rights by false
22
labeling.”
This “false labeling” of the significance of an adjudication was,
at the time, just a theoretical problem. In 1959, when the 1917
Juvenile Court Act was rewritten, the requirement that an
adjudication not be deemed a “criminal conviction” was
23
24
maintained, along with the traditional rationale.
In fact, the
15. 1917 Minn. Laws 561, 569-70.
16. Peterson v. McAuliffe, 151 Minn. 467, 187 N.W. 226 (1922).
17. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
18. Peterson, 151 Minn. at 469, 187 N.W. at 226.
19. Id. at 470, 187 N.W. at 227. Peterson followed a Minnesota case, State ex rel.
Olson v. Brown, which pre-dates the establishment of juvenile courts in Illinois in
1899. 50 Minn. 353, 52 N.W. 935 (1892). In State ex rel. Olson v. Brown, the court
held that a juvenile sent to reform school by a justice of the peace was not being
“punished” and so had no right to a jury trial. Id. at 357, 52 N.W. at 936.
20. See, e.g., State ex rel. White v. Patterson, 188 Minn. 492, 494, 249 N.W. 187,
188 (1933) (holding that probate court may place delinquent children under
guardianship).
21. Monrad G. Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REV. 547
(1957).
22. Id. at 550.
23. The re-codification occurred in 1959. 1959 Minn. Laws 1275, 1296
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premise that a juvenile adjudication was not a conviction survived
the Gault revolution and surfaced again in McKeiver v. United
25
States.
The McKeiver Court called for a pause, which has lasted thirtyfive years, in the Gault movement to require states to incorporate
adult due process provisions in their juvenile courts. Among
others, the argument that “the stigma attached upon delinquency
adjudication approximates that resulting from conviction in an
26
adult criminal proceeding” was rejected. Jury trials were not to be
required because juvenile court proceedings could not be said to
27
be totally “criminal” in nature. The Court had access to studies
that showed states commonly allowed juvenile adjudications to
become as well known as adult criminal convictions, but
nevertheless clung to the juvenile court founders’ rehabilitative
28
ideology. Thus, the due process drive was stopped, and the stage
was set for much broader use of adjudications in various “public
safety” provisions without the need to have trials by jury.
III. THE MOVEMENT TO USE JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS
FOR “PUBLIC SAFETY”
Juvenile courts were founded on the premise that youths who
committed crimes in our society were to be given the opportunity
29
for rehabilitation. Changing social and legal norms produced the
30
changes in the way juveniles were treated in the legal system.
Previously, under social ideas of the time, children were viewed as
miniature adults and this treatment influenced how children were
31
treated by the courts. Initially, a difference was knowingly created
in juvenile court whereby a juvenile’s adjudications were not
considered with comparable harshness to those with a similar
(codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 260B.245 (2004)).
24. Maynard E. Pirsig, Juvenile Delinquency and Crime: Achievements of the 1959
Minnesota Legislature, 44 MINN. L. REV. 363, 410 (1960). “A youth is not held
responsible for his acts in the criminal law sense but, instead, is subjected to
treatment and rehabilitation.” Id.
25. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). Justice Blackmun
authored the plurality opinion. Id.
26. Id. at 542, 550.
27. Id. at 541.
28. Id. at 568 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
29. See Kristin L. Caballero, Blended Sentencing: A Good Idea for Juvenile Sex
Offenders?, 19 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 379, 384 (2005).
30. Id. at 384 n.26; see also Transformation, supra note 1, at 693-95.
31. Caballero, supra note 29, at 383-84; Transformation, supra note 1, at 693-94.
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32

history of offenses in adult criminal courts.
Thus, from their
inception until the late 1960s, the juvenile courts followed the
33
progressive, rehabilitative visions on which they were founded.
However, changes on the horizon for juvenile court systems were
forecasted in two cases decided in that decade.
First, in 1966, the Supreme Court decided Kent v. United
34
States. In that case, the Court upheld the waiver of juvenile court
jurisdiction of a sixteen year old, and provided guidelines for
juvenile court judges to consider in a determination to waive
35
jurisdiction over a juvenile offender. This decision paved the way
for courts across the country to allow for waiver of juvenile courts’
jurisdiction and to prosecute juvenile offenders in the adult
36
system.
Then, in 1967, the United States Supreme Court handed down
37
their decision in In re Gault.
The Supreme Court in Gault
recognized the constitutionality of juvenile courts’ creation of
38
different rules regarding the treatment of juvenile offenders.
However, the Supreme Court went on to criticize the maintenance
of secrecy of the juvenile courts by noting that in reality the secrecy
39
was “more rhetoric than reality.” The court noted that juvenile
records were routinely released to various other government
agencies and even sometimes to private entities such as potential
40
employers.
Ultimately, the Gault Court held that juveniles, in
proceedings where there was a liberty interest at stake, must have
41
the essentials of due process and fair treatment.
While the
emphasis on due process and fair treatment rights initially seems
positive, it has been posited that this has created the result of
shifting the focus of the juvenile court from its traditional emphasis
on the rehabilitative needs of the juvenile offenders to their “legal

32. See Sanborn, supra note 4, at 8.
33. Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice
Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 969-71 (1995).
34. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
35. Id. at 554, 566-67.
36. Caballero, supra note 29, at 387-88.
37. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
38. Id. at 14-15.
39. Id. at 24.
40. Id. at 24-25.
41. Id. at 41. These essentials of due process and fair treatment included
notification to the juvenile and his or her parents of the right to counsel and
appointment of counsel if they were unable to afford their own attorney. Id.
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42

guilt.”
Nationwide, the general trend in the past thirty years is toward
stronger punishment and sentences for criminals, and away from
43
rehabilitative ideals. Sentencing guidelines were not in use in any
jurisdiction at the beginning of the 1970s when McKeiver was
44
decided.
Since that time, the adoption of determinate or
mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines has become
45
widespread at the national level. The use of sentencing guidelines
46
has been seen in juvenile adjudications as well.
One
commentator has proposed that the use of sentencing guidelines in
the juvenile courts is directly contradictory to any stated
rehabilitative juvenile purpose; in large part because the State is
treating juveniles the same as it is treating adults, simply by using
47
sentencing guidelines for both types of offenders.
Nationally, during the mid 1980s, serious crimes committed by
juveniles decreased along with serious crime rates for the rest of
48
the country.
However, violent crimes committed by juvenile
49
offenders increased in the late 1980s and into the 1990s. This was
due in part to greater access to guns by juveniles and dramatic
increases in the homicide rate, especially among urban African50
American juveniles.
Corresponding with these trends was an
increase in public awareness and concern regarding violent
51
juvenile offenders.
IV. ATTEMPTS BY STATES TO CONSIDER BOTH JUVENILE COURTS’
PURPOSE AND PUBLIC SAFETY CONCERNS
The growth of juvenile court caseloads in the 1960s and 1970s
contributed to inadequate and ineffective adjudications of juvenile
52
offenders. This may have lead in part to the negative change in
the way many Americans perceive the juvenile court system, giving
rise to the belief that there is a problematic increase in juvenile
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Transformation, supra note 1, at 695.
Id. at 717.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 717-18.
Feld, supra note 33, at 975.
Id. at 976-77.
Id. at 977-78.
Id.
Caballero, supra note 29, at 385-86.
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53

crime rates.
Statistics show that violent crimes committed by
54
juveniles did rise in the 1980s and early 1990s. These statistics,
along with the development of new social science theories on
55
juvenile offenders, and enhanced media attention focused on
violent crimes committed by juveniles such as school shootings like
those at the Red Lake Indian Reservation this past year, have all
combined to foster a negative image of juvenile offenders in the
56
eye of the American public.
Both courts and legislatures have responded to the American
public’s increased concern with juvenile crime in various ways.
States seem to be conscious of the rehabilitative tradition of the
juvenile courts, but implementing methods to deal with juvenile
offenders has yielded mixed results. States have proceeded to
attempt to develop ways to consider both the interests of the
juvenile and to address the public’s growing concerns with juvenile
crime. In the 1980s, courts across the nation began to consider
formal measures to use juvenile adjudications in sentencing adults
57
in criminal court proceedings.
These national trends were reflected through a similar
58
experience in Minnesota. The focus in the 1980s began to shift
from attempts at rehabilitation of juvenile offenders toward public
safety concerns. The argument is, that while some juvenile
offenders fall under the stereotypical category of kids making
mistakes, the legal system should also be watching out and
59
protecting the public from the “career criminals.” One marked
change reflecting this shift in the juvenile courts can be seen in the
change in the purpose of the juvenile court statute in Minnesota in
60
the 1980s.
When initially enacted, the legislature defined the
purpose of the juvenile courts as
to secure for each minor under the jurisdiction of the
court the care and guidance . . . as will serve the spiritual,
emotional, mental and physical welfare of the minor and
the best interests of the state . . . and when the minor is
53.
54.
55.
389-90.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 389.
Id.
Id. One example is the development of the “superpredator theory.” Id. at
Id.
Sanborn, supra note 4, at 11-12.
See Feld, supra note 33, at 978-79.
Feld, supra note 5, at 1181-82.
Dismantling, supra note 1, at 192.
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removed from his own family, to secure for him custody,
care and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that
61
which should have been given by his parents.
The purpose clause of the Juvenile Act was changed in 1980 in
Minnesota with regard to juvenile offenders who committed crimes
to note a purpose “to promote the public safety and reduce
62
juvenile delinquency.” The Juvenile Act noted that this purpose
was also to sustain “the integrity of the substantive law prohibiting
certain behavior,” and that the juvenile adjudications were further
63
to “develop[] individual responsibility for lawful behavior.” These
amendments exemplified the legislative change from a primarily
rehabilitative model of juvenile justice to a more punitive system
64
that was aimed at stopping career criminals in the making.
V. CONSIDERATION OF JUVENILE RECORDS IN ADULT SENTENCING
Additionally, although controversial, states have increasingly
adopted methods to consider a juvenile’s history of offenses in
65
sentencing.
Under the traditional conception of the juvenile
court, juveniles were not officially considered repeat offenders
when they became adults and were thus prosecuted in the criminal
66
court system.
However, although adult offenders with juvenile
adjudications were not officially recidivists, apparently some
criminal courts did consider juvenile records in sentencing adult
67
offenders.
This trend of considering juvenile records in adult
convictions became more accepted and, in the 1980s, at least thirty68
three jurisdictions had accepted the practice. Today the practice
is widespread, although states certainly have not been uniform in
how juvenile records should be considered in adult sentencing
69
procedures.
For example, a juvenile record may impact only
certain types of sentencing, such as in criminal cases; others may
not consider it in sentencing if there is a possibility of the
61. Id. at 192 n.87 (citing the Juvenile Court Act, 1959 Minn. Laws 1275
(repealed 1980)).
62. MINN. STAT. § 260.011, subd. 2 (1980) (current version at MINN. STAT. §
260.001, subd. 2 (2004)).
63. Id.
64. See Dismantling, supra note 1, at 192; Feld, supra note 5, at 1181-82.
65. Sanborn, supra note 4, at 11.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 20-21.
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70

application of the death penalty.
Additionally, the manner in
which states have allowed the practice of consideration of juvenile
records in adult sentencing may vary; it may be by statute—either as
part of the juvenile court statute or adult court statutes—or else by
71
case law.
Justification for using juvenile adjudications in adult
sentencing was considered for a variety of reasons. Public approval
for “getting tough on crime” grew as the rates of violent crime
72
among juveniles increased.
In addition, arguments were made
that courts need a mechanism to differentiate between real first
73
time offenders and actual repeat offenders. Further, the courts
do not like the idea that juvenile offenders may get what some have
called a “cloak of immunity” from their juvenile criminal pasts
74
when they reach adulthood.
Furthermore, approval of this trend was granted by the federal
government when the 1992 Attorney General’s Task Force on
Combating Violent Crime appeared to give weight to the idea that
it is one thing to forgive the juvenile records of the now law-abiding
adult for whom their juvenile adjudication was characterized as a
youthful indiscretion, but another for the person for whom
75
juvenile offenses were merely the beginning of a life of crime.
This federal approval extended to making the recommendation
that state sentencing guidelines be modified to allow juvenile court
76
adjudications to affect adult sentences.
These national trends on juvenile courts can be seen in the
changes undergone by Minnesota juvenile courts in the past few
decades. Juvenile courts in Minnesota have changed from being
the fatherly “child-protective” style courts envisioned by the
founders, to more punishing in response to the “get tough on
crime” pressures felt in many parts of the country. These changes
are particularly notable in the areas of considering juvenile
adjudications in adult sentencing, the impact of juvenile
adjudications on determining whether someone is a “patterned sex
offender,” and by requiring juveniles to register as “predatory sex
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
1984)).
75.
76.

Id.
See id. at 17-20.
See id. at 15-16.
Id. at 16.
Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Smith, 481 A.2d 1365, 1366 (Pa. Super. Ct.
Id. at 17.
Id.
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offenders.”
A. The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Allow Consideration of a
Juvenile Record in Adult Sentencing
On May 1, 1980, the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
77
The Guidelines were
(“Guidelines”) became effective.
implemented in Minnesota in part to make punishment for felony
78
offenses more uniform and proportional. Under the Guidelines,
a criminal history is comprised of four items: an offender’s “(1)
prior felony record, (2) custody status at the time of the offense,
(3) prior misdemeanor and gross misdemeanor record, and (4)
79
prior juvenile record for young adult felons.”
Pursuant to the
Guidelines, an adult offender is “assigned one point for every two
offenses committed and prosecuted as a juvenile that are felonies
80
under Minnesota law.”
However, the juvenile court’s findings
must be based either on an admission by the juvenile or found after
81
a trial.
Additionally, offenses for which points are received must
“represent[] a separate behavioral incident or involve[] separate
82
victims.”
The offender must also have committed the offense
after the age of fourteen, and must not yet be twenty-five when the
83
felony was committed for which the offender is being sentenced.
Finally, the Guidelines provide that in most circumstances an adult
offender being sentenced will be able to receive only one point for
84
a juvenile record. The application of these guidelines has been
upheld by Minnesota courts.

77. Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Reform in Minnesota, Ten Years After: Reflections
on Dale G. Parent’s Structuring Criminal Sentences: The Evolution of Minnesota’s
Sentencing Guidelines, 75 MINN. L. REV. 727, 727 (1991).
78. Id.
79. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, § II, subd. B (2005).
80. Id. § II, subd. B(4).
81. Id. § II, subd. B(4)(a).
82. Id. § II, subd. B(4)(b).
83. Id. § II, subd. B(4)(c)-(d).
84. Id. § II, subd. B(4)(e).
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B. Minnesota Cases Allow Consideration of a Juvenile Record in Adult
Sentencing
On January 28, 1983, two decisions were handed down by the
Minnesota Supreme Court which considered an adult offender’s
85
juvenile record in sentencing. In Jackson v. State, the court
determined whether a dispositional and durational departure was
86
justified under the facts of the case. Although the court in Jackson
did not specifically consider the application of points from the
offender’s juvenile record in computing his criminal history, the
court concluded “that the trial court had grounds for a
dispositional departure, given the defendant’s long juvenile record
87
and his prior failures in treatment programs.”
On that same day, the Minnesota Supreme Court also decided
88
State v. Torgerson. In 1982, Torgerson was convicted of aggravated
robbery after he and another person robbed a gas station and used
89
a knife in commission of the offense.
However, previously on
April 10, 1978, Torgerson was adjudicated delinquent in juvenile
court after admitting to two burglaries, one theft, and three
90
aggravated forgeries. In Torgerson, the issue was directly regarding
the use of the defendant’s juvenile record in determining his
91
The supreme
criminal history score for sentencing purposes.
court in Torgerson held that when a trial court computes the
criminal history score of an offender who is not yet twenty-one at
the time he committed the felony, a trial court can assign only one
point total for the defendant’s prior juvenile adjudications if he
had two adjudications for offenses that would have been felonies if
committed by an adult, provided that the adjudications related to
92
offenses occurring after the defendant’s sixteenth birthday. In so
holding, the supreme court reviewed the Minnesota Sentencing
85. 329 N.W.2d 66, 66 (Minn. 1983). The court noted that this case involved
a petitioner who had committed his crime after May 1, 1980 when the Sentencing
Guidelines became effective, unlike most of its appeals at that time which involved
petitioners seeking retroactive application of the Guidelines. Id. at 66.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 67.
88. 329 N.W.2d 63 (Minn. 1983).
89. Id. at 64.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 65. Under the current sentencing guidelines, prior juvenile
adjudications, if they would have been felonies if committed by an adult, can be
used in calculating a defendant’s criminal history if the offenses occurred after the
defendant’s fourteenth birthday. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § II.B.4.c (2005).
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93

Guidelines and the comments. After reviewing the comments, the
court noted that the “apparent intent” of the guidelines was to
“allow use of a . . . juvenile record in determining his criminal
history score only if the defendant has twice been through the
juvenile court system and twice been adjudicated delinquent on the
94
basis of felony-type behavior.”
Later that same year, in April 1983, the Minnesota Supreme
95
In that case, the
Court decided the case of State v. Peterson.
supreme court determined that the trial court correctly assigned
the defendant one point for his juvenile record for the purposes of
determining his presumptive sentence after being convicted of
96
simple robbery. The court noted the confusion on the issue was
due to the fact that in the defendant’s juvenile adjudications the
juvenile court referee did not specify that the defendant was being
97
“adjudicated delinquent.” The defendant argued that his juvenile
record should not count for the purposes of computing his
98
criminal history under the Guidelines. The court held this was
not a valid argument as the defendant had been “adjudicated” for
an earlier offense, such that the delinquent adjudication also
applied retroactively to the four prior offenses committed by the
99
defendant.
100
The court revisited the issue again in 1988 in State v. Little.
When Little was seventeen years old he was serving time at the
101
Anoka County Juvenile Center. During his sentence, on February
25, 1987, after an altercation with staff, Little was confined to a
“strip room” which was used for isolation with only a mattress in
102
it.
Little had a cigarette and matches in his pocket, and after
smoking the cigarette, Little began lighting the matches and
103
After a time, Little realized the
tossing them over his shoulder.
93. Torgerson, 329 N.W.2d at 65.
94. Id.
95. 331 N.W.2d 483 (Minn. 1983).
96. Id. at 484.
97. Id. at 485. There was no argument regarding the characterization of the
offender’s crimes. Id. The court noted that Peterson “clearly engaged in and
admitted engaging in repeated felony-type behavior after he became 16 years old.”
Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. 423 N.W.2d 722 (Minn. 1988).
101. Id. at 722-23.
102. Id. at 723.
103. Id.
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104

mattress was on fire and began calling for assistance.
After a
delay, the staff finally responded to Little’s cries for help, but by
105
that time the fire had grown beyond control.
The incident
resulted in between $40,000 and $50,000 worth of damage to the
facility; three inmates had to be rescued after being trapped by the
106
fire, with one of those inmates sustaining second-degree burns.
For this incident, Little was certified as an adult and pled guilty to
107
In determining Little’s sentence based
arson in the first-degree.
on the sentencing guidelines, the trial court determined his
criminal history points based on two prior juvenile court
108
adjudications before his sixteenth birthday.
Little appealed, arguing that the Guidelines provision allowing
the use of a prior juvenile adjudication in adult sentencing was
109
contrary to the purposes of the Minnesota Juvenile Court Act.
The court held that the use of juvenile adjudications to compute
adult criminal history points as provided for by the Guidelines was
not contrary to the Juvenile Court Act which expressly stated that
juvenile adjudications could be used to determine adult
110
sentencing.
Additionally, Little argued that a majority of jurisdictions have
held that juvenile adjudications cannot be used to enhance
111
criminal convictions in habitual offender proceedings.
The
supreme court stated there was no merit to this argument, and
112
cited evidence that the opposite was in fact true.
The court went on to note that the Guidelines limit the use
and impact prior juvenile adjudications can have on adult
113
sentencing.
The court stated that the legislature has noted the
difference between juveniles whose crimes may be characterized as
youthful indiscretions and those that become career criminals
114
upon reaching adulthood. The court noted “the system punishes
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. One adjudication was for receipt of stolen property and the other was
for burglary in the second-degree. Id.
109. Id. The Juvenile Court Act is codified at Chapter 260 of Minnesota
Statutes.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 723-24.
112. Id. at 724.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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only those offenders who have abused the juvenile court’s leniency
and then does so only within the confines and safeguards supplied
115
by the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines.”
C. Minnesota Allows Juvenile Adjudications to Count Towards
Identification of a “Patterned Sex Offender”
Evidence of Minnesota’s changing ideas towards juvenile
adjudications can also be found in the willingness of courts and the
legislature to allow juvenile adjudications to count towards
someone being judicially characterized for sentencing purposes as
116
a “patterned sex offender.”
D. Minnesota Requires Qualified Juveniles to Register as “Predatory Sex
Offenders”
Currently, all states in the United States require some type of
registration and/or community notification of predatory sex
117
In 1991, Minnesota passed the “Predatory Offender
offenders.
118
In 1994, the Minnesota Legislature reRegistration Act.”
evaluated the act and decided to expand the law to juveniles who
are “petitioned for” or “adjudicated delinquent” of certain
119
crimes.
The legislature debated in 1999 regarding community
120
notification where the sex offender is a juvenile. Although some
legislators strongly asserted that the interest in “public safety”
overrode the privacy interests of juvenile offenders, the measure
121
failed to pass.
1.

In re Welfare of C.D.N.

122

In 1997, the Minnesota Court of Appeals heard the case In re
123
Welfare of C.D.N.
Originally two cases, they were consolidated on
115. Id.
116. MINN. STAT. § 609.108, subd. 4 (2004).
117. Wayne A. Logan, Jacob’s Legacy: Sex Offender Registration and Community
Notification Laws, Practice, and Procedure in Minnesota, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1287, 1289 (2003).
118. Id. at 1293. Minnesota’s predatory sex offender statute is codified in
Minnesota Statutes section 243.166.
119. Logan, supra note 117, at 1293.
120. Id. at 1309.
121. Id.
122. 559 N.W.2d 431, 432 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
123. Id.
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124

appeal. Both cases raised the issue of whether, for a juvenile who
is adjudicated delinquent for the commission of criminal sexual
acts, the subsequent mandatory requirement to register as a
125
predatory sex offender is a violation of due process.
The
juveniles argued that their due process rights were violated because
juvenile courts do not provide juveniles with the right to a jury
126
trial.
The court noted that prior cases in Minnesota have held
that registration as a sex offender is considered a non-punitive
measure because it “serves the regulatory purpose of assisting
127
police investigations.”
The fact that the statute was also
applicable to juveniles did not change this non-punitive
128
characterization.
The court also found that the sex-offender
registration statute kept the juvenile proceedings confidential
129
because the registration data was only given to police. The court
further found that the statute did not restrict juvenile offenders’
access to employment or education and did not affect their
130
freedom to travel.
The juveniles also argued the requirement that they register as
sex offenders was contrary to the purpose of the juvenile court as a
131
rehabilitative system. The court noted that in other cases, such as
the application of juvenile adjudications to enhance adult criminal
history scores, no violation of due process was found even though
132
there was no right to a jury trial.
The court further found the
statute requiring juveniles adjudicated delinquent for criminal
sexual conduct to register as predatory sex offenders was
unambiguous and therefore “the letter of the law shall not be

124. Id.
125. Id. Defendant C.D.N. was eleven years old when she allegedly sexually
abused a four year old child. Id. C.D.N. was adjudicated delinquent after entering
an admission to a charge of second-degree criminal sexual conduct pursuant to
Minnesota Statutes section 609.343, subd. 1(a) (1996). Id. In the second case, the
appellant, seventeen year old A.R.L., entered an admission on the charges he
engaged in sexual intercourse with a fourteen-year-old girl. Id. A.R.L. was also
adjudicated delinquent. Id.
126. Id. at 433.
127. Id. (citing State v. Manning, 532 N.W.2d 244, 248-49 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995)).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 434.
132. Id. (citing State v. Little, 423 N.W.2d 722, 724-25 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)).
See supra Part V.B. for a discussion of the Little decision.
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133

disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit.” The court
firmly emphasized this point by stating, “[t]o repeat, registration
does not substantially interfere with the rehabilitation of
adjudicated juveniles because it is non-punitive and, therefore, the
registration statute is not inconsistent with the rehabilitative
134
purpose of the juvenile court system.”
While the C.D.N. court upheld the decision to require
juveniles adjudicated delinquent for criminal sexual conduct
without the right to a jury trial to register as predatory sex
offenders as not violating the defendants’ due process rights, it was
135
The C.D.N. court noted decisions by both
critical of the statute.
the U.S. Supreme Court and the Minnesota Supreme Court, which
held that juvenile proceedings are not required to provide the right
136
to a jury trial.
The court also pointed out that the Minnesota
Legislature had recognized the importance of due process rights
protected by a jury trial in the creation of extended juvenile
jurisdiction (EJJ) prosecutions, which it acknowledged as being
able to balance the right to a jury trial with potential adult
137
penalties.
In rejecting the appellants’ proposed remedies to
provide constitutional protections to juvenile sex offenders, the
138
court noted that this was an area best left to the legislature. The
court stated:
Although we acknowledge the importance of the right to
a jury trial, the deficiencies of the juvenile system, as a
matter of constitutional law, are not fundamentally unfair.
Nevertheless, we respectfully invite the legislature to
review the prudence of requiring all juveniles adjudicated
for criminal sexual conduct to register as predatory sexual
139
offenders.
2.

State v. Lilleskov

140

In 2003, the Minnesota Court of Appeals addressed the issue
of whether the 1994 statutory amendments, which required
juveniles to register as predatory sexual offenders when adjudicated
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 434-35.
Id.
Id. at 434.
Id.
Id. at 435.
658 N.W.2d 904 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
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for certain acts, applied retroactively to a juvenile who committed a
141
The court of
criminal sexual act prior to the amendments.
appeals reviewed the purpose of the statute as being a useful tool to
142
assist with law enforcement investigations. However, the court of
appeals held that because prospective application was not expressly
provided, and because the 1994 amendments merely broadened
the scope of the statute to include juvenile offenders, the statute
143
could be applied retroactively.
3.

144

In re Welfare of J.R.Z.

145

In
J.R.Z. was a juvenile with a history of severe problems.
1998, when he was less than ten years old, he put his two week old
stepsister inside a freezer, almost killing her; she was revived by
146
emergency medical assistance.
J.R.Z. was then placed in a
residential treatment facility where in 2000, after being charged for
engaging in sexual conduct with another child, he pled guilty to
fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct and was adjudicated
147
delinquent. J.R.Z. remained at the facility and in 2001 was again
charged with criminal sexual conduct, this time for sexual contact
148
J.R.Z. admitted to the charges of
with an eight-year-old girl.
third-degree criminal sexual conduct and was again adjudicated
delinquent, which required him to register as a predatory sex
149
offender pursuant to statutory law.
The court, noting the nonpunitive nature of the sex offender registration requirement and
the plain language of the statute, stated it was applicable to J.R.Z.
150
even though he was only eleven years old.
Additionally, the
nature of the criminal acts for which J.R.Z. was adjudicated
delinquent were of the nature specified in the statute so as to
151
require his lifetime registration as a predatory sex offender.
The
court was not oblivious to this unusual result but still held: “We
conclude that the plain language of the registration statute
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 905.
Id. at 908.
Id.
648 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
See id. at 243-44.
Id. at 243.
Id. at 243-44.
Id. at 244.
Id.
Id. at 248.
Id.
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compels [J.R.Z.’s] lifetime sex-offender registration. This may . . .
be a harsh result. But harsh or not, the decision concerning the
152
reach of the statute rests with the legislature.”
Thus, while the Minnesota courts have upheld the use of
juvenile adjudications for adult sentencing and other purposes,
they have also continued to note the lack of constitutional
safeguards and the production of harsh results, and have suggested
time and again that the Minnesota Legislature review these statutes.
VI. MINNESOTA’S SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT CRIMINALIZING
JUVENILE COURT
Just as the tide of due process requirements turned in
McKeiver, creating opportunities to label juveniles with criminal tags
to carry into adult life without the expense of a jury trial, eventually
the “public safety” movement in Minnesota juvenile court history
reached its limit as well. This can be seen in the development of
the EJJ concept, in the legislature’s rejections of community
notification proposals for juvenile sex offenders, and in
Minnesota’s embrace of the adolescent brain development studies,
which send the message: juveniles ARE different.
A. The “EJJ” as an Alternative to Offense-Based Certification
By enacting provisions for EJJ in 1994, the Minnesota
Legislature continued to walk down both of the diverging juvenile
153
justice paths.
On one hand, that year’s juvenile justice bill
provided for “automatic certification” or “offense exclusion” for
154
On the other hand, only First Degree
certain juvenile offenses.
Murder, if allegedly perpetrated by a juvenile aged sixteen or
seventeen, was excluded from the definition of “delinquent
155
child.”
Even attempted First Degree Murder by those older
156
teenagers was retained in juvenile court.
For other youths charged with felonies, the Minnesota
Legislature enacted a system of two types of certification to adult
157
court: presumptive and non-presumptive. This approach allowed
152. Id.
153. See 1994 Minn. Laws, ch. 576, § 14 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. §
260B.130 (2004)).
154. See MINN. STAT. § 260B.007, subd. 6(b).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See id. § 260B.125.
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for the possibility of adult criminal sanctions for serious juvenile
offenses, but it retained discretion in the juvenile court judge, who
158
might still decide to keep the alleged offender in juvenile court.
The most striking innovation in this piece of legislation,
however, was the creation of what is now widely known as “blended
sentencing,” the option to designate an alleged young offender as
159
an EJJ.
This process allows the juvenile court to maintain
jurisdiction over an individual until age twenty-one, rather than
160
giving jurisdiction up at nineteen.
During this period, the
individual is treated as both a juvenile and an adult by the court’s
imposition of both a juvenile disposition and a stayed adult
sentence, which may be executed if the juvenile disposition order is
161
violated.
It took an extraordinary political struggle in the legislature to
create this complex, sophisticated compromise to the problem of
162
serious juvenile crime. The development of EJJ marked at least a
pause in the national trend of increased certification and offense
inclusion. As the leading commentator put it: “Importantly, as
other states contract the scope of juvenile court jurisdiction, the
Minnesota Legislature expanded it. Rather than weakening the
163
role of the juvenile court, the new Minnesota laws strengthen it.”
This accomplishment is especially remarkable because four
previous juvenile justice reform task forces had been unable to pass

158. Compare with offense exclusion strategies in other states, discussed in
Dismantling, supra note 1, at 185-88. See also Kathryn A. Santelmann & Kara
Rafferty, Juvenile Law Developments—“One Last Chance”: Applying Adult Standards to
Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile Proceedings—State v. B.Y., 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 427
(2003) (discussing in detail Minnesota’s Extended Juvenile Jurisdiction laws).
159. MINN. STAT. § 260B.193, subd. 5(c).
160. Id. subd. 5(a), (b).
161. Id. § 260B.130, subds. 4, 5.
162. See Feld, supra note 33 (discussing the history, amendments, and court
decisions in response to Minnesota’s new juvenile jurisdiction laws); see also
Patricia Tobert et al., JUVENILES FACING CRIMINAL SANCTIONS: THREE STATES THAT
CHANGED THE RULES, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION
(2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/181203.pdf (discussing
programs implemented in Minnesota, New Mexico, and Wisconsin that have
altered jurisdictional and sentencing laws for certain juvenile offenders). The
“blended sentence” concept had been tried in a few cases in Hennepin County
Juvenile Court prior to the 1994 law under the name “stayed certification”—that
is, the court would certify a juvenile to adult court but stay the order based on
certain conditions. The practice was not explicitly authorized by statute until the
1994 law was enacted. Id. at 27.
163. Feld, supra note 33, at 967.
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164

their recommendations through the legislature.
How did the EJJ bill succeed politically where other juvenile
reform bills had failed? At least three factors helped the EJJ bill
prevail. First, the Supreme Court took ownership of the proposals
by appointing the Task Force; early in the process, a popular Justice
165
with outstanding political skills was elected Chair.
Second, the
juvenile justice reform recommendations were built on the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines in that various categorizations of
young offenders were based on whether their cases would or would
166
not have led to presumed prison sentences had they been adults.
Thus, the recommendations had a foundation in the Minnesota
criminal justice system with a fifteen-year track record of success.
Third, the blended sentencing proposals appealed to a commonsense understanding that adolescent crime should be understood
as occurring along a spectrum and should not be mechanically
answered with black-and-white rules. As Barry Feld put it: “The
Task Force recognized that one fundamental deficiency of all
waiver legislation is its binary quality, either juvenile or adult, even
though adolescence is a developmental continuum requiring a
167
continuum of controls.”
In short, EJJ was a compromise, which helped it succeed in the
political marketplace, where it was vigorously marketed. The Task
Force members invested time in focus groups, public hearings
around the state, meetings with editorial boards, lobbying, and
168
legislative hearings in the Minnesota House and Senate.
One area of concern that suffered in the compromise was
policy on the use of juvenile adjudications in adult criminal
169
court.
Greater use of these adjudications was, by implication, a
necessary part of the EJJ package. The message to prosecutors was
this: You concede that the serious juvenile offenders can have “one
last chance” to complete a juvenile disposition; if they make it, fine,
170
but if not, you can really go after them. The EJJ reforms actually
164. Id. at 987-97.
165. Id. at 997. The chair was Justice Sandra S. Gardebring, a former
Commissioner in the cabinet of Governor Rudy Perpich. One of the authors was a
member of this Task Force, as well as two task forces that did not manage to pass
any legislation, and was able to observe Justice Gardebring’s skilled political
leadership first-hand.
166. Id. at 1027-28.
167. Id. at 1038.
168. Id. at 997-1005.
169. Id. at 1057-67.
170. See Santelmann & Rafferty, supra note 158, at 431-32.
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171

made the punishments of young adult offenders more serious.
B. Community Notification of Juvenile Sex Offenders Fails in the
Legislature

The passage of the 1994 bill, however, established a zone of
special treatment mandated for serious young offenders, extending
in many cases until their twenty-first birthday. The legislature’s
sometimes explicit, sometimes tacit, acceptance of this principle
led to a series of decisions to reject proposals to carry out
community notification procedures based on juvenile adjudications
for sex crimes.
The late 1990s was a period of great legislative activity in
expanding access to information about sex offenders living in
communities across the country.
Most common were the
enactment of registration statutes and the creation of community
172
notification through “Megan’s Law” provisions.
The main
difference between these approaches, which accounts for the
adoption of registration requirements for juveniles in Minnesota
and the rejection of juvenile community notification, is that
registration information is exclusively for access by law enforcement,
while—as the name implies—community notification goes to the
173
public.
In 1999, a bill was introduced in the Minnesota Senate that
would have provided for “community notification of the release of
174
certain high risk juvenile sex offenders.”
The bill followed adult
sex offender community notification practices in its focus on
individuals who were about to be released from secure institutions,
and, through a screening process, had been selected as likely to reoffend. Nevertheless, the bill failed to pass out of the Crime
Prevention Committee for several reasons:
 lack of a screening tool for juveniles;
171. For example, EJJ convictions would count like adult felony convictions.
Ordinary juvenile adjudications would be allowed to count as “criminal history” for
a longer period, and criminal histories would start with offenses committed at age
fourteen, rather than sixteen. Feld, supra note 33, at 1057-66.
172. In Minnesota, the registration law is Minnesota Statutes section 243.166;
the community notification law is Minnesota Statutes section 244.052.
173. See generally Timothy E. Wind, The Quandary of Megan’s Law: When the
Child Sex Offender Is a Child, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 73 (2003); Stacey Hiller, Note,
The Problem with Juvenile Sex Offender Registration: The Detrimental Effects of Public
Disclosure, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 271 (1998).
174. S.F. 1531, 1999 Leg., 81st Sess. (Minn. 1999).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006

23

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 4
04STUART-ZASKE.DOC

942

4/5/2006 1:27:36 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:3

 concern for the juvenile offenders’ families;
 fear that the public labeling of offenders would do more
harm than good; and
 absence of the due process protections that exist in the
175
adult system.
A very similar bill was introduced in 2000, and, again, did not
176
pass.
In 2001, a simpler bill was proposed, which would have
mandated community notification of the release of adjudicated
juvenile sex offenders who had been committed to the
Commissioner of Corrections and were being released only because
177
they had become too old to stay in the juvenile system.
This bill
did not pass out of committee. In 2005, the same bill was
introduced again, and yet again did not clear the Crime Prevention
178
Committee; however, a high-profile case led to the passage of
many other stringent sex offender provisions proposed in H.F. 1,
179
the 2005 crime bill.
In short, the legislature, in a period when there has been great
public concern about sex crimes, has declined in four separate
years to pass a bill extending community notification procedures to
sex offenders who were adjudicated delinquent rather than being
convicted of crimes in adult court.
C. Roper and the Adolescent Brain
Nationally, proponents of the view that a juvenile crime is not
just like an adult crime were bolstered by Roper v. Simmons, which
held that it would be cruel and unusual punishment to execute an
180
offender for a murder committed at age seventeen.
Meanwhile,
in Minnesota and elsewhere, criminal justice professionals of all
sorts began to show tremendous interest in the emerging science of
181
adolescent brain development.
Both these phenomena aid the
175. One of the authors of this Article attended the Committee hearing,
March 19, 1999, and testified in opposition to the bill.
176. S.F. 2486, 2000 Leg., 81st Sess. (Minn. 2000).
177. S.F. 12, 2001 Leg., 82nd Sess. (Minn. 2001).
178. S.F. 9, 2005 Leg., 84th Sess. (Minn. 2005).
179. See 2005 Minn. Laws, ch. 136, art. 2 (increasing penalties for certain
sexual offenses).
180. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
181. See Joel V. Oberstar, Elise M. Anderson & Jonathan B. Jensen, Cognitive
and Moral Development, and Mental Illness: Important Considerations for the Juvenile
Justice System, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1051 (2006); Gar, Baird, & Otto,
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argument that juvenile offenders are different from adult criminals,
and its corollary, that society should think differently about a
juvenile adjudication and an adult criminal conviction.
Christopher Simmons, age seventeen, committed a horrible
182
crime in Missouri.
As a high school junior he decided that he
wanted to kidnap a stranger and kill her by throwing her off a
183
bridge.
With the help of two younger friends he committed this
crime and, in a trial held after he had turned eighteen, he was
184
convicted of capital murder.
The Supreme Court determined that he should not be
executed because of an evolving national consensus that juveniles
should be regarded as “‘categorically less culpable than the average
185
criminal.’”
The Court explained that there are three main
differences between juvenile and adult offenders: lack of maturity,
susceptibility to influence, and the fact that “the character of a
186
juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult.”
This ruling
corresponds with recent scientific findings on adolescent
development. One influential study has made the following
findings:
Youths in early and mid-adolescence generally are
neurologically immature. Their brains are “unstable”;
they have not yet attained their adult neurological
potential to respond effectively to situations that require
careful or reasoned decisions and they may be more
inclined than adults to act impulsively. . . . [R]ecent
neurological research reveals that psychological
immaturity in adolescents . . . likely has a basis in
187
biology.
Adolescent Brain Development, Lecture at the Hennepin County Medical Center
Symposium (May 7, 2004); The Adolescent Brain: Helping Prosecutors Address
Psychiatric Evaluations and Competency Challenges, Address at the Columbia
University Symposium (Sep. 29, 2003); David Knutson, Direct Examination of
Brain Development Experts, Address at the Public Defender Annual Conference
(Nov. 20, 2004); Laurence Steinberg, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: A
Developmental Perspective on Adolescence and the Law, Invited Master Lecture
Before the Society for Research in Child Development, Tampa, Florida (Apr. 26,
2003).
182. Roper, 543 U.S. at 556.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 557-58.
185. Id. at 567 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002)).
186. Id. at 569-70.
187. Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, Due Process,
and Juvenile Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 793, 813 (2005). The facts of Little, supra
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Thus, when the Minnesota Legislature met in the spring of
2005 to decide how juvenile adjudications should or should not be
considered in the sentencing of young-adult offenders, the
background was different from the early 1990s, when the trend was
to treat every juvenile adjudication as an adult conviction in the
name of “public safety.” Legal, psychological, and medical ideas
were on the table, which might be taken up in the legislative
process, to support a more nuanced approach to the use of juvenile
adjudications. There was room for legislators to agree with
neurologists and with the U.S. Supreme Court that the
consequences of a juvenile offense did not have to be quite the
same as if the prior crime had been perpetrated by an adult.
VII. CONCLUSION: EXTENDING THE TIME FOR DECISIONS ON THE
YOUNG OFFENDER
Minnesota’s juvenile courts celebrated their centennial
anniversary in 2005. This is a time to think about where the
juvenile justice enterprise is going in its second century; but as the
legislature convened in January, it was far from certain that the
members would come to a new understanding of the meaning of
juvenile adjudications.
It seemed especially unlikely to see this change come in the
thinking about responses to repeat sex offenders. The kidnapping
and murder of Dru Sjodin in the Fargo-Moorhead area led to a
pointed re-visitation of sex crime statutes, which had just recently
been amended in the “Katie Poirier Law.” The 2004 session, which
ended without resolution of the differences between House and
Senate, saw the House pass provisions for life sentences for
Criminal Sexual Conduct in the First, Second, Third, and Fourth
188
Degree.
The Senate, somewhat more restrained, adopted some sixtyyear sentences, but created an indeterminate life sentence for
189
anyone convicted of a “second or subsequent sex offense.” This
raises the question of how an offender becomes a “second
offender,” and the answer, in the 2004 Senate bill, is that the
individual gets this status if he or she “has already been convicted or
adjudicated delinquent for another sex offense in a separate
Part V.B, illustrate the point.
188. H.B. 2028, 83rd Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2004).
189. S.B. 1863, 83rd Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2004).
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190

behavioral incident. . . .”
The adoption of this provision could
have greatly increased juvenile court litigation, since any juvenile
sex offense—unwanted fondling on the band bus trip; seventeenyear-old male with a fourteen-year-old girlfriend, etc.—would have
had the potential to be the first step on a two-step journey to life in
prison.
As the 2005 public safety bill moved through the House, it
became clear that very serious responses to sex crimes had heavy
support. The version which cleared the floor in late April, and
proceeded to the Senate for conference committee purposes,
included, depending on the circumstances, the following: twenty
years-to-life indeterminate sentences; life without parole; fines up
to $35,000; special “predatory offender” drivers’ licenses and
191
vehicle plates; and court-ordered castration.
Previous juvenile
adjudications were now part of the mix, in that offenders could be
sentenced to twenty years-to-life if convicted of Criminal Sexual
Conduct in the First, Second, Third or Fourth Degree as a
“subsequent” if the offender had already been “adjudicated
192
delinquent” for one felony- or two non-felony-level sex offenses.
Across the street, the Senate bill limited life sentences to
offenders with either two prior offenses, or one prior offense with
193
aggravated circumstances.
A big step occurred, however, in the
definition of a prior “conviction”: a juvenile offense would only
count if it was a felony sex offense “conviction” pursuant to the
extended juvenile jurisdiction law, Minnesota Statutes section
194
260B.130. This variation on the definition both narrows the past
juvenile offense pool to the most serious cases, and responds to due
process advocates, inasmuch as the EJJ offenders had a right to a
195
jury trial.
One problem remaining with this approach is that EJJ
adjudications would have counted as “priors” even where the
juvenile successfully completed the juvenile court disposition
order. These young offenders, in other words, would have done
what the juvenile judge required, stayed in juvenile court, and still
190. Id. art. 1, § 8 (emphasis added). The House avoided this problem by
providing life sentences for the first adult offense—the juvenile history being
considered irrelevant.
191. H.B. 1, 84th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2005).
192. Id.
193. Id. “Non-felony” offenses would include, for example, indecent exposure.
194. S.B. 2273, 84th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2005).
195. Id.
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would have received “subsequent offense” treatment later on.
By the end of the legislative session, this problem, too, was
resolved creatively. The final language enacted provides that a
“conviction” includes an EJJ adjudication for Criminal Sexual
Conduct in the First, Second, Third or Fourth Degree, and the new
Criminal Sexual Predatory Conduct if “the adult sentence has been
196
executed.” To put it bluntly, this treatment gives the EJJ offender
up to age twenty-one to become either a rehabilitated juvenile or
an adult criminal, and the chosen path is to be reflected in positive
or negative consideration of the juvenile offense if the individual
commits a new sex crime as an adult. This result, as noted,
provides for due process, solves the Blakely/McFee problem, and
delays the decision on the meaning of the adjudication until the
197
offender is twenty-one.
Even where the offender violates the
disposition order, the adult sentence is executed only about half
the time, because the juvenile judge has the ability to revise
198
conditions of probation.
Moreover, if the EJJ adjudication was
for an offense other than a felony sex crime, as in eighty-four
percent of the cases, it does not trigger the repeat-offender
199
provision of the new adult sex offender sentencing law.
The
serious juvenile sex offender who becomes an EJJ, in other words,
has considerable opportunity to mature beyond the adolescent
development issues noted in Roper and the brain development
studies to avoid having the adjudication count in adult court.
The “executed adult sentence” standard for considering EJJ
adjudications in the sentencing of adult sex offenders is a big step
forward from previous proposals to count any juvenile adjudication
the same as a criminal conviction. It builds on Minnesota’s
previous nationally recognized blended sentencing and the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. Other areas of the law, which
treat an adjudication the same as a conviction should be
reconsidered in this light.
On the other hand, this new balance between competing
196. MINN. STAT. § 260.161 (1994).
197. 2005 Minn. Laws ch. 136, art. 2, § 21, subd. 1(b).
198. Of course, fairly often if there is a new adult offense, it will occur at the
age of eighteen, nineteen, or twenty, vitiating the EJJ treatment and also carrying
its own consequences. See EMILY F. SHAPIRO, INST. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, EXTENDED
JURISDICTION (EJJ) OFFENDERS: A STUDY OF REVOCATIONS 3-5 (2001) (finding that in
1999-2000 there were 151 revoked EJJ’s, of whom half were revoked for
committing a new crime).
199. Id. at 5.
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interests in evaluating an adjudication was demonstrated in only
this one, albeit very important, legislative determination. There are
places in the same new law where an adjudication is treated just like
a conviction. In the provision for conditional release of nonviolent
controlled substance offenders, for example, a previous
delinquency adjudication for a “violent crime” precludes early
release even if the offender has successfully completed treatment in
200
prison.
Because juvenile law continues to serve constituencies who
have conflicting ideas of its purpose, it is hard to talk about
“progress.” For instance, if a heinous, high-profile sex crime is
committed by a twenty-two year old who has a former EJJ sex
offense; the political process will entertain many proposals for the
reinstatement of this kind of adjudication in subsequent
201
sentencings.
At least for the moment, though, the 2005
legislature has taken a meaningful, courageous step toward the reemerging idea that a juvenile crime should not carry the same
social meaning as the same offence committed by an adult.

200. See id. at 21. Only 6.5% of the revoked EJJ offenders had been
adjudicated for sex crimes, that is, ten people out of the two-year sample of 151.
Id.
201. 2005 Minn. Laws ch. 136, art. 13, § 6, subd. 2(6). The list of “violent
crimes” is in Minnesota Statutes section 609.1095 and is rather extensive. For
example, a juvenile who is adjudicated for Second Degree Manslaughter for
negligently killing someone in a hunting accident would, as an eventual
imprisoned young adult drug offender, be barred from early eligibility for
conditional release.
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